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INTERPLANT TRANSFER AND
TERMINATED WORKERS: A CASE STUDY
DAVID B. LIPSKY
ON MARCH 7, 1962, the General FoodsCorporation announced that four
plants in its Jello-O Division would be
shut down over the ensuing two or three
year period and their operations con-
solidated in a new facility to be built
on a site to be determined. About 1,800
workers were threatened with displace-
ment by the corporation's decision.
The four affected plants were the Min-
ute Rice and Tapioca plant of Orange,
Massachusetts; the original Jello-O dessert
plant of LeRoy, New York; the Franklin
Baker Coconut plant of Hoboken, New
Jersey; and the Walter Baker Chocolate
plant in Dorchester, Massachusetts.
After deciding to shut down the plants.
Following its decision to close four plants
and transfer their operations to a new location,
the General Foods Corporation offered jobs in
the new plant to all 1,800 affected employees
and payment of their transfer expenses. To those
electing not to transfer, the Corporation offered
severance pay. Less than a fourth of employees
transferred to the new location. This study
analyzes in detail the characteristics of the
movers and nonmovers and the subsequent em-
ployment experience of the latter. It concludes
that those workers who most needed the job
and income protection offered by the transfer
plan were least likely to take advantage of the
opportunity.
David B. Lipsky is assistant professor. New
York State School of Industrial and Labor Re-
lations, Cornell University. He expresses thanks
for advice to Charles A. Myers, Douglass V.
Brown, Abraham J. Siegel, and John Dunlop
and to many persons now or formerly asso-
ciated with General Foods Corporation, espe-
cially Harry Ghandler.—EDITOR
the General Food Corporation instituted
an "interplant-transfer system." It offered
to all of the affected workers—blue-col-
lar and white-collar alike—an oppor-
tunity to relocate to the new plant at
company expense. This article concen-
trates on two facets of the experience
of workers affected by the plant shut-
downs. After briefly describing the na-
ture of the interplant-transfer system,
the author discusses certain correlates
of relocation, i.e., factors which seem
to be related to whether a worker elected
to terminate or to transfer with the
company to its new plant. Second, the
labor-market experience of a sample of
Walter Baker workers who elected ter-
mination is examined.
The major findings of this study are
that corporate relocation expenditures
tended to benefit those workers who
would have been affected least adversely
by displacement and that workers who
would have benefited most from the re-
location opportunity were least likely
to elect it. This implies that from the
point of view of the workers, the pro-
grams m.ight have been recast to improve
the distribution of the amount of as-
sistance the company was willing to offer
the affected workers.
The Nature of the Samples
The data for this study were obtained
from an interview schedule adminis-
191
192 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
tered by the author to 116 terminated
Walter Baker workers and 215 workers
who had relocated to the new plant.
At the time this study was begun—
September 1964—the Walter Baker plant
was still employing 304 workers out of
a peak work force of 825. At that point,
there were 230 workers who had been
eligible to transfer, but who had elected
to stay in the Boston area. It was decided
to interview as many of the 230 as possi-
ble. Of the 304 still employed, another
230 were to be terminated over the next
eight months. Therefore, the number of
terminations as of September 1964 rep-
resented only one half of the number
who eventually were to be terminated
at Walter Baker.
Unfortunately, time and cost con-
straints, as well as the inaccessibility of
many of the terminated workers, per-
mitted usable, completed interviews to
be obtained from only 116 former Walter
Baker employees. Fortunately, complete
access to company personnel records
allowed a check to be made on both the
reliability of the responses of those in-
terviewed and the representativeness of
the sample, i.e., whether the 116 in the
sample were representative of the 460
total terminations at Walter Baker.
The overwhelming majority of those
interviewed supplied information which
checked remarkably well with company
records. The deviation on any of five
items cross-checked was extraordinarily
slight.i In addition, the interviewed
workers were compared with all termi-
5 items were date of birth, years of
seniority, weekly wage or salary, amount o£
severance pay, and years of school. The strongest
tendency exhibited was a predilection on the
part of a few individuals to overstate the num-
ber of years they had spent in school. The
net aggregate error on this item, however, was
estimated to be no greater than plus 5%.
nations on four items and were found to
be a representative selection.^
Interviews were obtained from the
relocated workers in June 1965. Work-
ers were administered a confidential,
fixed-choice questionnaire on company
premises. Of the 215 workers inter-
viewed, 137 had transferred from the
Walter Baker plant and are the focus
of comparisons with terminated Walter
Baker workers. The 137 workers repre-
sented more than 73 percent of those
Walter Baker employees who had re-
located to the new plant.
The Relocation Opportunity
On September 5, 1962, six months
after the shutdown notice, the Corpo-
ration announced that the site for the
plant would be Dover, Delaware. By
February 1964, the new plant was near-
ly completed and the manufacturing
process was begun. Some Walter Baker
workers were transferred to the new fa-
cility as early as October 1963. Termina-
tions began early in 1964 and were con-
tinued through the spring of 1965 when
the Walter Baker plant, after two cen-
turies of manufacturing chocolate, was
closed permanently.
In the months following the initial
announcement of the closing of the four
plants. General Foods developed a set
of policies designed to cushion the im-
pact of the shutdowns on the workers.
These policies included providing to
all workers a generous opportunity to
relocate to the new plant—a rather
novel approach, but indicative of the
direction taken by many companies in
recent years.^  It should be noted that
^Years of school was not an item used to
check the representativeness of the sample, for
the reason cited in fn. 1.
^Arnold R. Weber, "The Interplant Trans-
fer of Displaced Employees," in Gerald G. Som-
ers, et al., eds. Adjusting to Technological Change
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Table 7. Walter Baker Transfers and Terminations, March 1962 to April 1965.
Hourly Employees Salaried Employees Total
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Terminations after 3/62 376 72.6 84 27.4 460 55.8
Transfers to Dover 69 13.3 118 38.4 187 22.7
Transfers to other General Foods units 5 1.0 6 2.0 11 1.3
Others* 68 13.1 99 32.2 167 20.2
Total employment—3/62 518 100.0 307 100.0 825 100.0
*Include3: (a) retired and deceased, but not including those who elected early retirement at their
termination date; (b) temporary and casuJil employees, not eligible for severance pay or transfer to
Dover; and (c) quits, resignations, discharges, and layoflFs.
while unions represented workers at
botb the Walter Baker and Franklin
Baker plants, they played virtually no
role in the development of the inter-
plant-transfer system. The Corporation
was apparently motivated by two fac-
tors in developing policy: (1) the desire
to maintain the "good will" of the com-
munities in which plants were being
closed, and (2) the need to insure an
adequate supply of labor at the new
plant—General Foods believed that it
would be difficult to recruit a quality
work force in the small community of
Dover.
Briefly, the Corporation guaranteed a
job at the new Dover plant to all 1,800
affected employees. An employee elect-
ing transfer would receive one week
off with pay at the time of his move
and reimbursement up to $1,000 for
transfer expenses, including the total
cost of packing and carting his house-
(New York: HaTper and Row, Publishers, 1963),
pp. 95-143. See also Norman M. Bradburn,
Interplant Transfer: The Sioux City Experi-
ence (Chicago, 111.: National Opinion Research
Center, University of Chicago Press, May 1964);
George P. Shultz and Arnold R. Weber, Strategies
for the Displaced Worker (New York: Harper
and Row, Publishers, 1966); and U.S. Bureau of
Employment Security (BES), V(^ork Force Adjust-
ments to Technological Change: Selected Em-
ployer Procedures (Washington: G.P.O., January
1963), Bulletin No. E-215.
hold furniture, travel expenses (meals,
lodging, etc.), and also most incidental
expenses. As an example of the last.
General Foods covered such items as
real estate brokerage fees, telephone in-
stallation costs, alteration of rugs and
draperies, and even prorated expenses
of unused portions of an automobile
license plate and operator's license. In
addition, the Corporation provided ex-
tensive counseling to employees, espe-
cially on housing in the Dover area.
(The Corporation would purchase the
homes of salaried workers if they wished
but not of hourly employees.) Every
employee, whether he transferred or not,
was offered a free trip to Dover to sur-
vey the community and the new plant.
For those who elected termination,
the Corporation offered a generous
severance-pay plan. Severance benefits
were based on age and length of service.
Terminated Walter Baker employees
received, on the average, about |l,500.
General Foods also provided employ-
ment counseling to terminated workers,
although it is generally agreed (even by
corporate management), that such coun-
seling was more or less perfunctory.
Table 1 shows that of 825 workers
employed at Walter Baker in March
1962, 187 (22.7 percent) transferred to
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Dover. However, only 13.3 percent of
the hourly employees elected transfer.
compared to 38.4 percent of the salaried
employees. The picture is similar when
all four plants are considered. Of the
1,800 employees at the four plants, 423,
or 23.5 percent, transferred to Dover.
But only 179, i.e., 14.2 percent of all
hourly employees transferred, compared
to 253, or 42.3 percent of all salaried
workers.
Some Correlates of Relocation
Table 2 contrasts, in summary fashion.
terminated Walter Baker workers with
relocated workers on several selected
variables. A basic determinant of relo-
cation was occupational status: profes-
sional, technical, managerial, and skilled
workers were much more likely to move
than operatives, laborers, and clerical
and sales people. A white-collar/blue-
collar distinction is not quite appropri-
ate here, since foremen and other crafts-
men were, in a relative sense, twice as
likely to move as clerical and sales per-
sonnel.
Sex was apparently the other variable
most strongly related to moving. About
10 percent of those who moved to Dover
were women; they were usually either
the wives of workers also transferring
to Dover or single "career" women.
There was a fairly clear inverse rela-
tionship between age and geographic
mobility. Older workers tended to elect
termination. However, this relationship
was not as strong as is typically the
case.* In fact, the difference in mean
'Herhert S. Parnes, Research on Labor Mo-
bility (New York: Social Science Research Coun-
cil, 1954), pp. 104-105. See also John B. Lansing,
et al. The Geographic Mobility of Labor: A
First Report (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Survey Re-
search Center, 1963), pp. 55-60: U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, Mobility and Worker Adapta-
tion to Economic Change in the United States
Table 2. Correlates of Relocation: A
Comparison of Terminated and Trans-
ferred Workers.
Terminated Transferred
Status of Worker (N=ll6) (N=137)
Percent salaried 25.9% 63.1%
Percent male 73.3% 89.9%
Mean age 46.7 years 43.7 years
Percent married 74.1% 87.4%
Mean number of
dependents 2.7 3.4
Meein years of school
(hourly) 9.2 11.3
Mean years of school
(salaried) 11.6 13.9
Mean years of seniority. . 13.3 16.1
Mean years of residence
in old area 41.6 29.9
Percent who owned a
home or who were in
the process of buymg
52.6% 62.3%
^^ terminated and relocated work-
^^^ j ^ ^^^ statistically significant.
Apparently, an interplant-transfer sys-
j
expected, given the mobility propensi-
^ workers.^
indeed, there are a number of surprises
^^^ proportion of married
was higher among the relocated
^^an among the terminated.
Moreover, the relocated workers had,
^^ ^^e average, more dependents than
^^^ terminated workers. Also there is
evidence to indicate a working wife was
^ barrier to the transfer of a Gen-
Foods worker. These results contra-
^ict popularly held notions about cor-
relates of mobility.
Most surprising, perhaps, is the find-
^ ^^^^ jj^ g proportion of homeowners
_Jr
(Manpower Research, Bulletin No. 1, July 1963),
p. 22.
'U.S. Department of Labor, Mobility and
Worker Adaptation.
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among the relocated workers was higher
than the proportion among terminated
workers. Even when the samples are
broken down by additional variables
(for example, occupation), this finding
is true. There are two factors which
might explain this unusual result: (1)
General Foods' provision of extensive
aid and assistance to the homeowner
who elected to transfer, and (2) the lack
of rental opportunities in the Dover area
which might serve as a disincentive to
move for those workers who had a pref-
erence for renting.
On other variables. General Foods
transfers tended to be more like typical
migrants. For example, relocated work-
ers were more educated than terminated
workers. In relative terms, about twice
as many relocated workers as terminated
workers had gone beyond high school.
Also, those who transferred had lived
fewer years in their old area than ter-
minated workers. Yet in absolute terms,
the relocated workers had been strongly
attached to their former communities,
averaging about thirty years of residence.
Most of the movement in this country
is done by a small proportion of the
people, and they, consequently, tend to
be short-term residents of the communi-
ties from which they move. Therefore,
in terms of years of residence in the
old area, the relocated worker was an
extremely atypical migrant.
It is clear that seniority was an im-
portant correlate of relocation. Only by
transferring to Dover could the General
Foods worker retain the privileges at-
tendant on long service. Seniority also
can be viewed as a measure of the work-
er's loyalty to the company. The plant
relocation was a test of his attachment
to the company vis-k-vis his attachment
to his community. There was a tendency
for long years of service with the com-
pany to dominate long years of resi-
dence in the old area, and thus for
seniority to be a crucial variable among
those found to be associated with relo-
cation.
A number of other variables which
might help distinguish "movers" from
"stayers" were examined but proved to
be insignificant. For example, family
income and asset-and-debt position were
not related significantly to relocation.
A Differing Pattern of Mobility
While no hard and fast conclusions
can be drawn on the basis of evidence
presented here, it appears that an in-
terplant-transfer system promotes a pat-
tern of mobility which differs from the
standard as determined by many other
studies of mobile workers. The relocated
or transferred worker is a mobile worker
only in the sense that he changes his
area of residence. Transferred workers
typically do not change their employer,
industry, occupation, labor force status,
or even their job assignment. In a sense,
the terminated worker can be considered
more "mobile" than the transferred
worker. The terminated worker reen-
ters the labor market or leaves the labor
force completely. He must, necessarily,
change employers, and this move prob-
ably will mean a change of industry
and often a change of occupation. Are
these changes of a higher or lower order
of mobility than geographic movement?
Who faces greater uncertainty and risk,
the terminated worker or the relocated
worker? One usually associates risk tak-
ing with the migrant—but is this really
true of the General Foods worker?
The typical mig;rant changes not only
his place of residence but also his em-
ployer, his industry, and very often his
occupation. "Labor mobility responds to
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opportunity,"* and this has been found
true for migrants. For example, migra-
tion rates are higher for the unemployed
than for the employed.'' But is it true
of the transferred worker? Does the trans-
ferred worker seek economic opportu-
nity—or economic security?
In the United States in 1964, the year
when most General Foods workers trans-
ferred to Dover, approximately 38 mil-
lion people changed their place of resi-
dence. Of this number, approximately
6.1 million moved between states, rep-
resenting 3.3 percent of the total popu-
lation.8 A study by the Survey Research
Center of the University of Michigan
revealed that of the total number of
moves made within the 1958-1962 pe-
riod, 16 percent were "triggered" by a
transfer or reassignment.^ Assuming
that this percentage is valid for 1964,
it appears that just under one million
people changed their state of residence
in that year as a result of a job transfer.
There is evidence that interplant-
transfer systems have grown in impor-
tance in recent years. Such plans have
now been incorporated in several im-
portant collective bargaining agreements
—most notably between the Steelwork-
ers and the steel industry. International
Harvester and the United Automobile
Workers, and Ford, Chrysler, and Gen-
'Gladys L. Palmer, "Interpreting Patterns of
Labor Mobility," in E. Wight Bakke, et al., eds..
Labor Mobility and Economic Opportunity (New
York: The Technology Press of M.I.T. and
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1954), p. 62.
'Seymour L. Wolfbein, Employment and Un-
employment in the United States (Chicago, 111.:
Science Research Associates, 1964), p. 222.
°U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Ab-
stract of the United States, 87th ed. (Washing-
ton: G.P.O., 1966), p. 32. The "year" is ac-
tually the twelve-month period between March
1964 and March 1965.
'Lansing, Geographic Mobility of Labor, p.
125.
eral Motors and the UAW.^ " There is
no way of knowing precisely how many
companies, such as General Foods, have
unilaterally instituted such systems.
However, a 1964 survey by the American
Management Association revealed that
256 of 329 responding companies had
"definite policies covering benefits for
employees transferred to other locations,"
and that 77 percent of these policies had
been developed in the ten-year period
just prior to the survey.^ ^
The growth of interplant-transfer
systems in American industry may por-
tend an increase in the number and
proportion of moves resulting from com-
pany relocations. If the results of this
study are any indication, the character-
istics of migrants in general may be
somewhat changed as a result of the
larger number of interplant transfers.
Unemployment Experience of the
Terminated Workers
Every major study of displaced or ter-
minated workers has been concerned
with specifying personal factors which
i°Weber, "Interplant Transfer of Displaced
Employees," pp. 95-143; Richard A. Beaumont
and Roy B. Helfgott, Management, Automation
and People (New York: Industrial Relations
Counselors, 1964), pp. 66-81. For the steelworker
plan, see United Steelworkers of America, AFL-
CIO, and United States Steel Corporation,
Agreement, September 1, 1965, Sections 13M
and 13N.
"K. K. White, Reimbursing Personnel for
Transfer and Relocation Costs (New York:
American Management Association, 1964), AMA
Research Study 67. It should be noted that most
policies applied to individuals or small groups
transferring. It is not clear that the same trans-
fer policies would be used in the event of
one or more plant shutdowns involving large
numbers of employees. Furthermore, it is clear
that blue-collar personnel do not receive the
same consideration as do white-collar person-
nel. "In fact, only half of the respondents in-
clude (the rank and file) in their policies; but
when they are covered they generally receive
comparable benefits" pp. 13-15.
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are important in the reemployment of
such workers.^ 2 jn this section the ter-
minated Walter Baker workers will be
analyzed with the same aim in mind.
One or two factors, such as alternative
sources of income and severance pay,
not extensively analyzed in other stud-
ies, are considered here. Also, an attempt
has been made to carry the analysis
farther than has been done in most
previous studies. Linear regression analy-
sis has been applied in an effort to weigh
more precisely the factors important in
the reemployment of terminated work-
ers. The results are given later. First,
a more traditional analysis of the vari-
ables is presented.
It must be kept in mind that a pre-
condition for the successful reemploy-
ment of any individual is an adequate
level of demand for labor in the market
in which job search takes place. In 1964
and 1965 the Boston labor market area
was classified by the Bureau of Employ-
ment Security as an area of "moderate
unemployment," i.e., unemployment was
in the 3.0 percent to 5.9 percent range.i^
The actual unemployment rate for the
Boston area was estimated to be 4.1
percent in November 1964; 5.1 percent
in January 1965; and 4.7 percent in
March 1965." It was in the November
"See the summary study by William Haber,
et al.. The Impact of Technological Change
(Kalamazoo, Mich.: The W. E. Upjohn Insti-
tute for Employment Research, 1963). Two
significant studies not summarized by Haber,
et al., are Richard C. Wilcock and Walter H.
Franke, Unwanted Workers (Glencoe, 111.: The
Free Press, 1963) and Irvin Sobel and Hugh Folk,
"Labor Market Adjustment by Unemployed Old-
er Workers," in Arthur M. Ross, ed.. Employ-
ment Policy and the Labor Market (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965),
pp. 333-357.
"BES, Area Trends in Employment and Un-
employment, January 1965, p. 8; February 1965,
p. 11; and March 1965, p. 8.
"BES, Area Trends, January 1965, p. 32;
March 1965, p. 40; and May 1965, p. 42.
1964 to March 1965 period that inter-
views with the Walter Baker workers
were obtained.
No extensive analysis of the jobs found
by the terminated workers is made here.
It should be noted, however, that those
workers who found new jobs usually
suffered a loss of wages and often were
forced to move into less skilled lines
of employment. The exceptions were the
skilled maintenance men, who were not
only able to maintain their previous
occupation but also often moved into
higher-paying jobs. Industrial mobility
for the sample was very high: less than
10 percent found new jobs in the food-
processing industry. With the exception
of the skilled maintenance men, wage
or salary reductions were most often re-
lated to age and duration of unemploy-
ment. Older workers were much more
likely than younger workers to take a
lower-paying job, if they were able to
find new employment at all. It also
appears that the longer a man had been
unemployed, the more likely it was that
he would be forced to take a lower
wage and/or lower-skilled job.
It should also be noted that with the
exception of those workers who found
new jobs immediately and a few who
were (for a variety of reasons) ineligible,
the entire sample received unemploy-
ment compensation from the state for
the period they were without work. The
standard allowance in Massachusetts in
1964 and 1965 was |45 a week for thirty
weeks, with |6 added for each dependent.
The degree to which the unemployed
worker was afforded financial protection
during his period of unemployment is
explored in the final section of this
paper.
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Table 3. Reentry of the Displaced Workers into the Labor Market: "When Did You
Begin to Look for Work When You Discovered You Would Be Laid Off by Baker?"
Sample
Began to Look for Work: Percent
Number of
Sample
Before the layoff 20 17.2
Immediately after the layoff 44 37.9
1-2 weeks after the layoff 17 14.8
One month after the layoff 10 8.6
More than one month after the layoff 5 4.3
Did not look for work 20 17.2
Total 116 100.0
Weeks of Unemployment
15 or Less 16 or More
Number Percent Number Percent
IB
18
5
4
1
3
90.0
40.9
29.4
40.0
20.0
15.0
2
26
12
6
4
17
10.0
59.1
70.6
60.0
80.0
85.0
49 42.2 67 57.8
Duration of Unemployment and
Reentry into the Labor Market
Table 3 shows the relationship be-
tween the reentry of the terminated
workers into the labor market and their
unemployment experience. A word of
explanation is needed concerning the use
of the term "unemployment." What is
actually being measured is the number
of weeks without work between the date
of the worker's termination and the
date of his first job, or the date of
his interview, if no new job was
found. "Weeks without work" would be
a more accurate title, but "unemploy-
ment" will be used; the reader should
keep in mind the author's definition of
the term.
In most cases, weeks without work
and weeks of unemployment are syn-
onymous. However, there were a num-
ber of workers who reported not looking
for work after being terminated. Table
3 shows that twenty workers reported
not looking for work at all after termi-
nation. These workers were, in a sense,
not unemployed, if one defines unem-
ployment to mean making an active
search for work. However, these work-
ers have not been eliminated from the
succeeding analysis for at least two rea-
sons. First, their removal would reduce
the sample size by 17 percent without
in any substantive fashion affecting the
analysis. Second, tbe answers supplied
by the workers are, obviously, less than
objective and may suffer from being post
hoc rationalizations. It is true that twelve
of the twenty were fifty-five years old
and older. However, when the reem-
ployment experience of this group is
compared to that of the twenty-seven
others in the sample age fifty-five and
over, it is not significantly different. This
lends substance to the belief that some
older workers "explained" their inabili-
ty to find work by their lack of search.
(Alternatively, one would have to argue
that the reemployment success of older
workers is not significantly affected by
the intensity of their job search.) Never-
theless, if one accepts the workers'
answers at face value. Table 5 does show
that active reentry into the labor mar-
ket and unemployment duration are
related. However, it is obvious that an
immediate active search was no guar-
antee of success. Of the forty-four work-
ers who indicated entering the labor
market immediately after layoff, almost
60 percent were unemployed for more
than fifteen weeks.
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Sex and Age
The terrainated workers averaged
18.6 weeks of unemployment. In con-
trast, the average duration for all un-
employed in the United States in 1963
was 14 weeks; in 1964 the average was
13.3 weeks.^ ® Allowance must be made
for this writer's definition of unem-
ployment in making direct comparisons,
however.
There was a marked difference in the
unemployment experience of men and
women. Terminated female workers
averaged 24.8 weeks of unemployment,
while males averaged only 16.5 weeks.
It may be true that some of these women
were not seeking work actively, but in
fact all but three reported entering the
labor market.
Almost all studies have shown that
age is a critical determinant of the re-
employment prospects of a displaced
worker. Haber, Ferman, and Hudson,
in their summary of eighteen studies of
displaced workers, concluded:
Of all the status characteristics, age appears
to have the greatest effect on re-employ-
ment opportunities. Many of the studies re-
ported that the older workers have a more
difficult time than the younger workers in
finding new jobs. The emphasis is on youth
in our changing technological system, and
the aged are at a disadvantage."
Among the terminated Walter Baker
workers, those over age fifty-five aver-
aged 23.6 weeks of unemployment.
Those under twenty-five averaged only
6.0 weeks. The differences were more
accentuated among females than among
males. Table 4 reinforces the belief that
reemployment difficulties became par-
"U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Ab-
stract of the United States, 87th ed. (Washing-
ton: G.P.O., 1966), p. 220.
"Haber, The Impact of Technological Change,
p. 24.
Table 4. Age Distribution and
Unemployment.
Age
24 or under. .
25-34
35-44
45-54.. .
55-65
Total
Weeks of Unemployment
15 Weeks or Less 16 Weeks or More
jVum6er Percent Number Percent
2
. . 13
17
12
5
49
100.0
59.1
70.8
41.4
12.8
42.2
0
9
7
17
34
67
0.0
40.9
29.2
58.6
87.2
57.8
ticularly acute for those over the age of
fifty-five.
Dependents and Education
There was a clear inverse relationship
between number of dependents and dur-
ation of unemployment for this sample
of terminated workers. Those who had
no unemployment at all averaged 4.2
dependents. Those with less than six-
teen weeks of unemployment had, on
the average, 3.4 dependents. Those with
sixteen or more weeks of unemployment
averaged 2.2 dependents. The mean
number of dependents for all workers
in the sample was 2.7, and it will be
recalled that relocated workers averaged
3.4 dependents apiece.
About 42 percent of the sample had
no dependents. About half of these per-
sons lived alone and the other half lived
with a working spouse. By comparison,
only about 6 percent of the relocated
workers lived alone.
Education is also related to unem-
ployment. For terminated Walter Baker
workers, those with less than twelve years
of school averaged 21.2 weeks of unem-
ployment experience. Those with twelve
or more years of education averaged 15.8
weeks. Clearly, completion of a high
school education made it less likely that
a terminated worker would have sixteen
or more weeks of unemployment.
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However, the relationship between
education and unemployment is not
strongly inverse. Within each broad edu-
cational group there were differences in
duration of unemployment based on age
and sex. Therefore, it appears that while
education is a determinant of reemploy-
ment, it ranks below age and sex in
terms of the strength of the relationship.
Severance Pay
The relationship between severance
pay and unemployment experience has
not been well explored in studies of
terminated workers. Haber and his as-
sociates, in surveying the literature, con-
cluded that "severance pay does not play
a major role in re-employment."^^ Most
studies of terminated workers have
found that they do not tend to use
severance pay to help directly in their
job search, for example, to undertake
retraining. The majority of studies have
found, as did Wilcock and Franke, that
"the primary effect of severance pay
seem(s) to be an easing of the financial
burden in the period immediately fol-
lowing the plant closing."^*
This study confirms the earlier find-
ings. About half the sample of termi-
nated workers had used their severance
pay, at least in part, to pay off accumu-
lated debts. About 40 percent indicated
that at least some of the severance pay
had been used to meet living expenses
in the period following termination.
About 60 percent noted that they had
added all or a portion of their sever-
ance allowance to their savings. This
figure is deceptive, however, because
many workers had received large lump-
sum amounts, had deposited the amounts
in their savings accounts, and then had
"Ibid., p. 24.
'^ Wilcock and Franke, Unwanted Workers,
p. 124.
drawn down the accounts over a period
of time to meet living expenses. The
60 percent figure overstates the amount
of real saving done as a result of the re-
ceipt of severance pay. Also, the larger
the amount of severance pay, the higher
the likelihood that the worker had added
it to previous savings.
A number of workers, nearly 20 per-
cent of the sample, in fact, had used at
least a part of their severance allowance
to take a vacation. Very few indicated
that their severance pay had gone to
pay off a mortgage, or even to make a
single mortgage payment. Finally, only
six workers had used any part of their
severance pay to aid them in finding
new work. These few workers had used
some of their severance pay either to
send out a resum^, to pay a private em-
ployment agency or, in one case, to pay
for the cost of a job-training program.
In sum, the Walter Baker workers tended
to use their severance allowances to pay
off debts and meet short-term living
expenses.
Was the receipt of severance pay a
help or hindrance in the terminated
workers' search for new work? One of
the earliest studies of displaced workers,
by Clague, Couper, and Bakke, found
that when displaced workers who had
received severance pay were compared to
those who did not, "month by month,
dismissal wage workers were finding
jobs about as quickly as the others.
There is not ground whatever for think-
ing that the dismissal wage operated in
any way as a drag on the workers' ini-
tiative."i8 Other investigators have not
been so sanguine about the effect of
"dismissal wages" on job search.^ o
"Ewan Clague, et al.. After the Shutdown
(New Haven, Conn.: Institute of Human Re-
lations, Yale University Press, 1934), p. 38.
"•Haber, et al.. The Impact of Technological
Change, p. 24.
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Among the Walter Baker employees,
there was a tendency for the number
of weeks of unemployment to be posi-
tively correlated with level of severance
pay. A relevant break appears to occur
at fifteen weeks of unemployment. Those
with less than sixteen weeks of unem-
ployment averaged $1,116 in severance
pay, while those with sixteen or more
weeks of unemployment averaged $1,800.
Table 5 seems to support the proposi-
tion that severance pay acted somewhat
as a hindrance on the reemployment of
Table 5. Severance Pay Distribution
and Unemployment.
Weeks of Unemployment
Severance Pay 15 Weeks or Less 16 Weeks or More
Number Percent Number Percent
0-$500....
$501-$1,000..
$l,001-$2,000..
$2,001-$4,000..
More than
$4,000
Total
20
10
10
8
1
49
54.1
50.0
35.7
34.8
12.5
42.2
17
10
18
15
7
67
45.9
50.0
64.3
65.2
87.5
57.8
the terminated workers. The relevant
break occurs somewhere in the neigh-
borhood of $1,000 of severance pay, with
those receiving less than $1,000 tending
to fall into the fifteen weeks or less
category, and those receiving more than
$1,000 likely to fall into the sixteen
weeks or more category. The evidence
is far from conclusive, however, and re-
gression analysis did not reveal a sig-
nificant relationship between level of
severance pay and duration of unem-
ployment.
Other Weekly Income: The Influence
of a Working Spouse
In addition to the receipt of severance
pay, many workers reported other sources
of income for their period of un-
employment. The primary source of
other weekly income was that received
by a working spouse. About 28 percent
of the terminated married male workers
had a working wife. In addition, how-
ever, workers reported receiving income
from such diverse sources as interest and
dividends on savings and investments,
rental income from owned property, and
money received from relatives not in
the worker's household. An attempt was
made to develop an amount which rejv
resented the weekly "income" of each
worker, exclusive of his own earnings
from work or any unemployment com-
pensation he might have received. The
figures developed can be considered no
more than estimates.
Table 6 shows that 61 percent of the
sample received some weekly income in
addition to what they might have earned
or received in unemployment compen-
sation. This figure includes workers who
might have been receiving as little as
a few dollars a week and as much
as $200 a week. There is a surprisingly
clear relationship between weeks of un-
employment and the percentage in each
category indicating receipt of other
weekly income. The table also shows that
Table 6. Other Weekly Income and
Weeks of Unemployment.
Weeks of
Unemployment
Percent
Number Indicating Mean
of Receipts Other
Workers of Other Weekly
Income Income
0 11 27 $ 6
1-5 12 33 30
6-10 14 57 47
11-15 12 50 25
16-20 12 67 32
21-25 26 69 64
26-30 10 70 41
31 or more 19 89 79
Sample 116 61 46
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the average amount of other weekly in-
come received by workers in the sample
was |46. Those with fifteen or less weeks
of unemployment averaged $29 a week
in other income, while those with six-
teen or more weeks of unemployment
averaged |59 a week.
It is clear that other weekly income
and duration of unemployment are posi-
tively related. This clearly demonstrates
the influence of a working spouse on the
labor market experience of the ter-
minated worker.
Seniority and Home Ownership
The more senior worker is often the
more experienced worker. His years of
service indicate that he is, in a sense, a
loyal worker. These attributes may make
him attractive to a prospective employer.
On the other hand, the more senior
worker is also likely to be an older
worker, and this study, as well as others,
has shown that age is a handicap in
gaining reemployment. Moreover, long
service might work against a worker if
an employer feels that it makes a work-
er less adaptable to a new environment
and more difficult to retrain.^^
Those workers with less than sixteen
weeks of unemployment had, on the
average, 11.2 years of seniority. Those
with sixteen or more weeks of unem-
ployment averaged 14.8 years of seniori-
ty. However, the variation in response
within each unemployment category was
great. A high proportion of Walter
Baker workers had been hired between
1950 and 1959; 65 percent of the sample
had between five and fourteen years of
service. Of those who had more than
fourteen years of service, 72 percent suf-
fered more than fifteen weeks of unem-
ployment.
id., pp. 19-20.
The relationship between seniority
and unemployment is similar to the re-
lationship between severance pay and
unemployment. This follows from the
fact that the amount of severance pay
received was largely a function of seniori-
ty. Hence, the two variables are very
much intercorrelated (R^ = .88). How-
ever, neither variable was a significant
explanatory factor of unemployment
duration when linear regression analysis
was applied to the data.
There was a slight tendency for home-
owners to have more unemployment
than renters. Of those with less than
sixteen weeks of unemployment, about
45 percent were homeowners. Of those
with sixteen or more weeks of unem-
ployment, about 60 percent were home-
owners. Apparently home ownership was
positively but not strongly related to
weeks of unemployment. It may be that
home ownership is a proxy for a work-
er's wealth or net equity position. More
affluent workers could afford to take
their time about finding new employ-
ment. In any event, a homeowner may
need to pay his property taxes and pos-
sibly mortgage charges but is not forced
to meet a monthly rental payment and,
therefore, is probably in a slightly bet-
ter position than the renter in terms
of the need to find new work.
Regression Analysis
Two previous studies have attempted
to explain the length of unemployment
of displaced workers by using multivari-
ate analysis. A study by John W. Dorsey
of workers displaced by the relocation
of the Mack Truck Company from Plain-
field, New Jersey, to Hagerstown, Mary-
land, in 1961, found five variables
significantly related to reemployment
success: age, skill, sex and family status,
education, and area of residence of the
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displaced worker (i.e., the number of
workers in a given area as a percentage
of total nonagricultural employment in
that area). Age was found to be quanti-
tatively the most important explanatory
variable. Severance pay was found to be
not significantly related to length of un-
employment.^2
A study by Palen and Fahey of dis-
placed Studebaker workers in South
Bend, Indiana, in 1964, found age and
education to be the most important vari-
ables in explaining length of unemploy-
ment. Race, occupation, and income had
significant regression coefficients, but
proved to be of little use in explaining
the variance in reemployment success of
the displaced workers.^s
For the present study the following
variables were used in the analysis:
Xi = weeks of employment, Xj = age,
X3 = number of dependents, X4 = other
weekly income, Xg = (0-male, 1-female),
Xg = weekly wage before termination,
X7 = years of school, Xg = severance pay,
and Xg = years of seniority.
Weeks of unemployment were used as
the dependent variable, and the next
eight variables as the independent vari-
ables.
Table 7 shows the results of the re-
gression analysis. It should be noted
that the difficulties of data collection
and the nonrandomness of the sample
imply that caution should be used in
interpreting the results. The selective
bias on some variables (such as age and
other weekly income) may be great. The
J W. Dorsey, "The Mack Case: A Study
in Unemployment," Studies in the Economics
of Income Maintenance (Washington: The
Brookings Institution, 1967), pp. 175-233.
''J. John Palen and Frank J. Fahey, "Un-
employment and Reemployment Success: An
Analysis of the Studebaker Shutdown," Indus-
trial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 21, No.
2 (January 1968), pp. 234-250.
results of the regression analysis should
be seen as suggestive, rather than con-
clusive.
Nevertheless, the results indicate fair-
ly conclusively that age, X,, provided
the best single explanation of length of
unemployment. The age variable alone
explains 10.5 percent of the total ob-
served variance in length of unemploy-
ment. (R2 is the coefficient of determina-
tion, adjusted for the size of the sample.)
Furthermore, the regression coefficients
for age in each of the eight equations in
Table 7 are highly significant, in all
but equation 6 at the .01 level.
The Palen and Fahey study found
that age alone explained 10 percent of
the variance in length of unemployment.
Tbe coefficients of the age variable were
remarkably similar to those in Table 7.2*
Two variables, age and number of
dependents, are able to explain 16 per-
cent of the variation in length of unem-
ployment. Equation 2 shows that while
age and unemployment are positively re-
lated, number of dependents and un-
employment are inversely related. The
larger the number of dependents, the
shorter the period of unemployment for
workers in this sample.
With the addition of other independ-
ent variables to the regression equation,
a greater percentage of the observed
variance in unemployment is explained.
However, tests of significance reveal that
the coefficients of the additional inde-
pendent variables are not as powerfully
related to length of unemployment as
age and number of dependents. For ex-
ample, when other weekly income, X ,^
is added to the equation, 17.4 percent of
the variation in unemployment can be
explained (equation 3). The coefficient
of age is still significant at better than
'^Ibid., p. 242.
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Table 7. Multiple Regression Analysis.
Equation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Intercept
1.4194
(4.4282)
8.2451
(4.9012)
7.2470
(4.8925)
5.1956
(4.9960)
12.0580
(7.8376)
18.7773
(10.2337)
13.6643
(11.5223)
16.9855
(11.9838)
.3640
(.0910)*
.3112
(.0910)*
(.2736)
(.0927) *
.2792
(.0920) *
.2931
(.0927) *
.2576
(.0990) t
.3306
(.1246) *
.3331
(.1246) *
Coefficients of the IndependentVariables
{standard errors in parentheses)
-1.6018
(.5551)*
-1.2296
(.5908) t
-.8691
(.6223)
-.8999
(.6221)
-.9428
(.6234)
-1.0272
(.6296)
-1.0547
(.6302) t
Xi
.0376
(.0217) t
.0277
(.0222)
.0252
(.0223)
.0249
(.0223)
.0235
(.0224)
.0196
(.0227)
X,
4.5884
(2.6757)]
3.3190
(2.8967)
3.9532
(2.9620)
4.1191
(2.9679)
4.2261
(2.9696)
Xt
t
-.0696
(.0613)
-.0688
(.0613)
-.0246
(.0765)
-.0448
(.0791)
Xy
-.4875
(.4775)
-.5680
(.4849)
-.5553
(.4850)
Xs X,
-.0010
(.0011)
.0003 -.2655
(.0018) (.2635)
.1053
.1593
.1739
.1880
.1901
.1904
.1899
.1900
*Signlficant at the .01 level.
fSignificant at the .05 level.
^Significant at the .10 level.
the .01 level, while the coefficient of
number of dependents becomes signifi-
cant at the .05 level and the coefficient
of the added variable, X4, is significant
only at the .10 level. When combined
with other variables, other weekly in-
come loses all it force.
The addition of the sex variable
(equation 4) allows more of the varia-
tion in unemployment to be explained
but washes away a high level of sig-
nificance for all but Xg, age. The addi-
tion of other variables does little to
increase the amount of variance ex-
plained.
Like Dorsey, the present study did
not find severance pay, Xg, to be sig-
nificantly related to length of unemploy-
ment. Notice that the sign of the co-
efficient changes from equation 7 to equa-
tion 8. Unlike both Dorsey and Palen
and Fahey, this writer did not find edu-
cation to be significantly related to our
dependent variable.
On the one hand, the fact that a
fairly meaningful regression can be ob-
tained with R2 no higher than about
.19 indicates that a large number of
factors possibly important in explaining
the reemployment experience of the ter-
minated workers have not been uncov-
ered. Any individual's success in gaining
new employment is undoubtedly the re-
sult of a complex set of economic, en-
vironmental, and behavioral factors. In
this sense, the application of regression
analysis yields disappointing results.
On the other hand, regression analy-
sis strongly reinforces the finding that
age is a critical barrier to the reemploy-
ment of terminated or displaced workers.
It also suggests that sex, alternative in-
come sources, and family size are addi-
tional factors which must be considered.
Finally, it supports the belief that large
amounts of severance pay affect the dis-
placed worker's job search in a minimal
way.
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Financial Protection for
the Unemployed
The weekly income of workers in the
sample was abnormally high in the year
or so prior to their displacement. The
primary reason for this was the unusual
amount of overtime available to workers
in the period preceding the plant clos-
ing. Also, collective bargaining negotia-
tions with the Butcher Workmen in the
summer of 1963 had resulted in a large
wage increase for the workers.
The corporation granted the union
demands in large part to insure labor
peace over the period of the plant clos-
ing and to prevent worker attrition
from rising to undesired levels. It is
likely that the Walter Baker workers
were overpaid, in the marginal produc-
tivity sense, in the year prior to their
termination. Averaging the income of
the terminated workers over a three-
year period, say 1963 to 1965, including
their unemployment compensation and
severance pay, probably would still put
them in a high earnings position relative
to other comparable groups of workers.
The financial protection offered the
terminated workers was substantial by
any criteria. The average wage of the
terminated worker in 1963 (prior to the
increase in earnings opportunit ies
brought about in the final year of the
plant's operation) was about $100 a
week; the average severance pay received
by the terminated workers was $1,500.
If the average worker was without work
for about nineteen weeks, about $80 in
severance pay could be used by the
worker in each week of his unemploy-
ment, and $1,500 would be exhausted in
the nineteenth week. The average work-
er had about two dependents, and so
would receive $57 a week in unemploy-
ment compensation for thirty weeks. The
average worker, unemployed for nineteen
weeks, could count on $137 a week in
income solely from unemployment com-
pensation and severance pay. Adding
the $46 figure received by the worker
from other sources, one finds that, on
the average, a worker unemployed for
nineteen weeks had at his disposal $183
a week.
Of course, the above calculations are
based on averages and cannot take ac-
count of the uncertainty or the hard-
ship which occurred in individual cases.
At the same time, the waste of produc-
tive resources, which resulted from real
unemployment among those terminated,
from the movement out of the labor
market by discouraged job seekers, and
from movement into inferior positions
which did not tap the full productive
potential of a few workers, should not
be neglected in estimating the extent of
the social problem resulting from the
plant shutdowns. In many cases the
short-run problems the workers faced in
the period following their termination
were probably not as great as the long-
run problems they would face after their
severance pay and unemployment bene-
fits were exhausted and after they found
themselves holding down a lower-paying
job than they had before the plant shut-
down.
Conclusion
This article has discussed the use of
an interplant-transfer system by the
General Foods Corporation when it
closed four plants and relocated their
facilities to a new plant in Dover, Dela-
ware. Two main questions have been
analyzed. Which workers were most like-
ly to transfer to the new plant? Among
the terminated workers, which workers
had the most difficult time finding new
employment? It turns out that the
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answers to these questions describe two
different sets of workers with nearly (but
not completely) opposite characteristics.
Workers likely to relocate differed from
workers sufEering difficult reemploy-
ment experiences on such factors as age,
sex, education, and family status. They
overlapped on only a few items, for ex-
ample, home ownership.
If one can be permitted to generalize,
the following appears to be true: work-
ers most likely to benefit from the pro-
tection of an interplant-transfer system
were least likely to exercise the option
of relocation. Workers who least needed
the protection were most likely to move.
It follows that if the General Foods ex-
perience is any guide, the use of an
interplant-transfer system can serve only
as a limited way of avoiding the hard-
ship of worker displacement after plant
shutdown. It would be better from the
viewpoint of the workers afEected by
plant shutdowns to offer them greater
protection for the period following their
displacement, rather than to devote cor-
porate resources to the enhancement of
relocation opportunities. In particular,
in such situations, companies and unions
should devise special policies to handle
the problem of the displaced older work-
er in the labor market. For example,
extension of company-supported health
insurance beyond termination would be
a particularly valuable form of protec-
tion for the older worker.
On the other hand, the interplant-
transfer system enabled the company to
achieve several of its objectives over the
relocation period. First, it guaranteed
the company an adequate supply of la-
bor (particularly skilled labor) at the
new plant. General Foods overestimated
labor recruitment difficulties in Dover.
Nevertheless, there were certain grades
of skilled labor in short supply, and the
company's relocation policies helped
forestall potential shortages. Second, as
an outgrowth of its relocation policies,
the company helped to insure an order-
ly transition to the new plant without
any diminution in the supply of its prod-
ucts to grocery shelves. Third, the com-
pany believes it enhanced its reputation
as an "enlightened" employer. Surveys
of both relocated and terminated work-
ers indicated their general satisfaction
with the company's innovative efforts.
Even local community reaction was fa-
vorable to the departing company. All
of this is not unimportant to a com-
pany dependent on the good will of a
consumer public. Finally, management
believes the benefits the company re-
ceived through use of the interplant-
transfer system far exceeded the costs.
The gross cost was |1.2 million. The cost,
net of severance allowances the company
would have been committed to pay re-
located workers, was $400,000, or under
11,000 per relocated worker.

